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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order reducing Mr. Hartzell's
felony stalking charge to a misdemeanor.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October of 2011, Mr. Hartzell was charged with felony stalking, I.C. § 18-7905,
1

based upon a civil protection order put in place by a Washington court. (R., pp.18-1 9.)
Mr. Hartzell filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude from introduction at trial all
testimony and evidence regarding the Washington issued protection order. (R., pp.9596.) At the hearing on the motion in limine, Mr. Hartzell presented eleven statements of
fact that had been stipulated to by both parties. 2 (Tr., p.11, L.17- p.12, L.17.) These
stipulated facts included that the protection order from Asotin County, Washington, was
not based on any allegation of domestic violence and the protected party, Cathlin
Berreth, and Mr. Hartzell were not in a domestic relationship.
L.13, p. 35, Ls.4-7; R., p.11 0.)

(Tr., p.11, L.17 - p.12,

Mr. Hartzell, through his counsel, argued that the

1

The order is actually entitled, "Order for Protection- Harassment." (Exhibit A)
(1) Ms. Berreth did not have a dating relationship with Mr. Hartzell; (2) Mr. Hartzell is
not Ms. Berreth's spouse or former spouse; (3) Mr. Hartzell is not related to Ms. Berreth;
(4) Mr. Hartzell and Ms. Berreth have never lived together; (5) Mr. Hartzell and
Ms. Berreth do not have any children in common; (6) Mr. Hartzell never physically
injured Ms. Berreth nor did he ever threaten to; (7) Mr. Hartzell never sexually abused
Ms. Berreth nor threaten to do so; (8) Mr. Hartzell never forcefully imprisoned
Ms. Berreth nor threaten to do so; (9) Ms. Berreth did not allege to the judge who issued
the protection order that any of the above was true; (1 0) Ms. Berreth never alleged
domestic violence; and (11) neither domestic violence nor any of the above mentioned
items constituted the basis for the Washington protection order. (Tr., p.11, L.17- p.12,
L.14.)
2

1

Washington protection order was not relevant because the Washington protection order
was not issued under similar provisions to Idaho Code§ 39-6306. (Tr., p.13, Ls.12-23.)
The district court granted Mr. Hartzell's motion in limine and ordered the
exclusion of the Washington order of protection, finding that it was not a protection order
as defined by I.C. § 39-6303 as it was not one issued pursuant to a provision of
Washington law similar to I.C. § 39-6306. (Tr., p.36, Ls.?-15.) The district court noted
that the situation in Mr. Hartzell's case was not one that could have made the basis for a
protection order under I.C. § 39-6306.

(Tr., p.35, Ls.19-21.)

Further, the State

stipulated to, and the district court found, that the Washington protection order was not
one that could have been obtained in ldaho. 3 (Tr., p.35, Ls.16-19.) The district court
found that the protection order contained only information that Mr. Hartzell committed
unlawful harassment as defined by Washington law. (Tr., p.35, Ls.11-14.)
The district court found that the Washington State statute under which the Asotin
County protection order was obtained was not analogous to I.C. § 39-6306, Idaho's
domestic violence protection order statute.

(Tr., p.35, Ls.19-21.)

The district court

examined the definition of "protection order", finding it is a term defined by Idaho statute,
I.C. § 39-6303(8). (Tr., p.34, Ls.16-18.) The district court noted that a "protection order"
is defined as an order issued in another jurisdiction pursuant to a provision similar to
l.C. § 39-6306. (Tr., p.34, Ls.17-21.)
3

The Washington protection order was obtained pursuant to Revised Code of
Washington§ 10.14.080, which allows a petitioner to seek a civil protection order upon
an allegation of harassment, without regard to the relationship between the parties to
the petition and without any allegation of domestic violence. RCW § 10.14.080. Idaho
does not have a similar or equivalent statute; in Idaho, a civil protection order may only
be obtained upon a showing that there is an immediate and present danger of domestic
violence which requires that the parties to have been either family or household
members or in a dating relationship. (I. C. §§ 39-6303, 39-6306; R., p.1 09.)
2

The district court reduced the charge to a misdemeanor, over the objection of the
prosecutor.

(R., p.111.)

Thereafter, the State appealed the district court's order

reducing the charge to a misdemeanor. (R., pp.117 -119.)

3

Has the State failed to show error on the part of the district court in finding that
Mr. Hartzell's stalking charge could not be enhanced due to the presence of the out-ofstate, non-domestic, order for protection? 4

4

Although the state repeatedly (See Appellant's Brief, pp.1-3) incorrectly refers to the
protection order as a "no contact order", the differences between a civil protection order
and a no contact order are significant. (See, e.g., the Ada County Guide to Protection
Orders, No Contact Orders & Restraining Orders at: http://www.adaweb.net/
Portals/0/CAO/documents/ProtectNoContactRestrainingOrders.pdf.)

4

ARGUMENT
The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Reducing
Mr. Hartzell's Stalking Charge To A Misdemeanor

A.

Introduction
The district court correctly found that the VVashington-issued protective order was

not a protective order as defined under Idaho law and could not be used to enhance the
stalking charge to a felony.

5

The district court granted Mr. Hartzell's motion in limine

and reduced the felony stalking charge to a misdemeanor.

B.

Standard Of Review
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.

401; State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 597,

603 (Ct. App. 1998). Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law. State v. Atkinson,
124 Idaho 816, 819 (Ct. App. 1993). This Idaho Supreme Court's standard of review on
issues of relevance is de novo. State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214 (2000).
In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de

novo. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 2011 ). In doing so, this Court is
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a
construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid
treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v.
5

To rule otherwise would treat out-of-state residents differently than in-state residents,
including violation of the right to travel derived from Article IV, § 2 of the United States
Constitution and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and such would also violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489 (1999).

5

Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177; State v.
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is plain

and unambiguous, the Appellate Court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1 999); State v.
Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1 999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App.

2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational
mean111g. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659. If the language is clear and unambiguous, the
Appellate Court does not need to look to legislative history or rules of statutory
interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389. "A statute is ambiguous where the language
is capable of more than one reasonable construction."

Verska v. St. Alphonsus

Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011) (quoting Porter v. Board of
Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, ·14 (2004)). An unambiguous

statute would have only one reasonable interpretation; an alternative interpretation that
is unreasonable would not make the statute ambiguous. Verska, 151 Idaho at 896.

C.

The District Court Correctly Found That The Washington Protection Order Could
Not Form The Basis To Elevate The Charge To Felony First Degree Stalking
1.

I.C. §§ 18-7905 and 39-6303 Are Not Ambiguous

The well-established standards for statutory construction are:
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
construction. The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious,
and rational meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is
no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory
interpretation. When the court must engage in statutory construction, it
has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent.
To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of
the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is incumbent upon

6

the court to give a statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity.
VVhere ambiguity exists as to the elements of a crime, this Court will
strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant.
State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641. 646,

P.3d 116, 121 (2001) (citations and internal

quotations omitted).
By using that particular language, the Legislature inherently limited the types of
orders that could be used to elevate a misdemeanor stalking to a felony under this code
section because "[i]t is a universally recognized rule of the construction that, where a
constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes
all others."' See, e.g., Local 1494 of lnt'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Gauer d'Alene,
99 Idaho 630, 639-40 (1978) (quoting Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375 (1941 )). Therefore, if
the term at issue does not properly conform to the requirements listed in the statute, it is
excluded from the scope of the statute. Specifically at issue here is whether any
document entitled a "protection order" is included in I.C. § 18-7905 or whether the
reader must utilize the definitions of "protection order" as set forth by the Idaho
legislature in I.C. § 39-6303(8) to analyze whether the protection order meets the
definition contained in the statute.

Terms in a statute are given their commonly

understood definitions, and if a statute is unambiguous, the courts must give effect to
the unambiguous language of the statute. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011 ).
Here, the term "protection order" is defined by statute.

I.C. § 39-6306(8).

Further, the definition of "protection order" also includes what qualifies as a protection
order in Idaho when the protection order is obtained in another jwrisdiction. I.C. § 396306(8)(b).

The state is asking this Court to disregard the legislature's definition of

7

"protection order" when determining whether the Washington state protection order
serves to enhance the stalking charge to a felony under I.C. § 18-7905. The legislature
defined what qualified as a "protection order" in Idaho:
"Protection order" means any order issued for the purpose of preventing
violent or threatening acts or acts of harassment against, or contact or
communication with, or physical proximity to, another person, where the
order was issued:
(b) In another jurisdiction pursuant to a provision similar to section 396306, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 39-6303(8)(b).
Notably, when drafting I.C. § 18-7905(a) the legislature did not utilize a "catch-all"
phrase such as "... or any substantially conforming court order including those from
foreign jurisdictions", or similar language which would indicate that the legislature
intended to include all court orders from other jurisdictions for which the general intent
or purpose was to prohibit communications or contact between persons.

But the

legislature did choose to utilize similar language when drafting the same statute to
describe the crimes for which a defendant's conviction could serve to enhance the
second degree stalking to a felony first degree stalking, so it clearly realized it could
broaden the means by which a second degree stalking charge could be enhanced to a
first degree stalking charge. See I. C.§ 18-7905(1 )(f). 6

6

1.C. § 18-7905(1 )(f) provides:
A person commits the crime of stalking in the first degree if the person
violates section 18-7906, Idaho Code, and:
The defendant has been previously convicted of a crime, or an attempt,
solicitation or conspiracy to commit a crime, involving the same victim as
the previous offense under any of the following provisions of Idaho Code
or a substantially conforming foreign criminal violation within seven (7)
years ... (emphasis added)

8

Thus, because that language of a statute must be given its "plain, obvious, and
rational meaning," the only way to read the felony stalking statute provision for a
"protection order" is to ascertain what the state is required to prove in order to convict
the Mr. Hartzell of felony stalking based on the existence of an out of state protection
order.
The district court correctly determined that the Washington state statute under
which the Asotin County protection order was obtained was not analogous to I.C. § 396306, Idaho's domestic violence protection order statute, and the only statute under
which a civil protection order can be obtained in Idaho. (Tr., p.35, Ls.19-21.) Further,
the state conceded that the order from Asotin County, Washington, was an "order of
protection-harassment," and could not have even been obtained in the State of Idaho.
The state also conceded that the petitioner in the Washington case would not have
qualified for a protection order or no contact order in the state of Idaho.

(Tr., p.35,

Ls.22-24.)

2.

Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Felony
Stalking Statute, Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In
Favor Of Mr. Hartzell

The United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an
ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court stated:
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this 'time-honored
interpretive guideline' serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define
criminal liability.

9

!d. at 1oo~1-1 002.) "It is well-settled that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly
and in favor of the defendant."

State v. McCoy, 1

Idaho 362, 365 ('1996).

"[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity." United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rewis v.

United States, 401 U

808, 811 (1971 )). Accordingly, Mr. Hartzell asserts that if it is

not clear whether or not the legislature intended to exclude foreign protection orders
that were not domestic in nature and which did not comport with the requirement of
LC. § 39-6306, this Court should read this statute in favor of Mr. Hartzell.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hartzell respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the district
court.
DATED this

gth

day of January, 2013.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAll lNG
FY that on this
I HEREBY C
correct copy of the foregoing RESPON
Mail, addressed to:
thereof in the U

day of January, 2013, I served a true and
NT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy

gth

PAUL CAREY HARTZELL
ASOTIN COUNTY JAIL
838 5TH ST
CLARKSTON WA 99403
JEFF BRUDIE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
GREGORY HURN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE 10 83720-0010
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court

EVAN A SMITH
,
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas

11

